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Measuring Power Consumption of Cryptographic Algorithms
INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of cyber-enabled, wireless devices
that enhance many aspects of life, including treatment
of diabetes. Type I Diabetes is a chronic autoimmune
disorder characterized by the destruction of pancreatic
B-cells and subsequent deficiency of insulin - a crucial
hormone in the regulation of blood glucose levels.
Implantable Medical Devices (IMD) are shrinking in
physical size which limits their memory, power, and
processing capacity resulting in the unsecure
transmission of data. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) has called for
encryption algorithms to be considered as the
lightweight cryptographic standard to combat these
vulnerabilities. In this poster, we analyze the power
consumption of a lightweight encryption candidate for
use in a continuous glucose monitor.

SECURITY GOALS
1) Cryptographic strength should be equal to or
comparable to round two candidates in the NIST
Lightweight Crypto Standardization project.
2) The power usage of the device cannot exceed the
max draw of the battery during encryption or regular
usage
3) The battery lifespan of a device using lightweight
encryption should be comparable to the device’s
default power consumption.

ForkAE is a lightweight authenticated encryption
scheme optimized for short messages. Fork is a
2nd-round candidate for the NIST Lightweight
Cryptographic Standard. In [1], it is claimed that Fork
is an appropriate cryptosystem for resource
constrained devices including IMDs. Figure 2 depicts
the mathematical structure of one round of Fork.

CONCLUSION
In the test runs we performed we were able to
perform encryption without exceeding the
thresholds measured in the control run. Our data
sets indicate a pattern that matches our
expectations, but there is too much interference
from the operating system to quantify the power
consumption. The similarity in data between trials
has a strong indication that the battery life of a
CGM with ForkAE would be comparable to the
device’s lifespan with default power consumption.

ForkAE

CONTINUOUS GLUCOSE
MONITOR (CGM)
● Transmits blood glucose levels from the interstitial
fluid every 5 minutes
● Bluetooth Low Energy communication
● Limited battery, memory, and computing resources
● Sensors last ~10 days, Transmitters last ~90 days

DATA

FUTURE WORK
Figure 4: Current draw of the Raspberry Pi without encryption

The graph above shows the current draw of the Raspberry Pi
without computing ciphertexts. The variation in current indicates lots
of interference from the needs of the operating system.

● Perform a similar test on hardware that is
resource constrained for a more accurate test
environment
● Compare the resource consumption of ForkAE
to other lightweight cryptographic algorithms
and AES
● Design a simplified version of ForkAE over
GF(52) in a 2x2 matrix to convert the block size
to 100 bits

Figure 2: Structure of one round of Fork [2]
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